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RETHINKING ASSIGNABILITY 
 
ABSTRACT: When should a contractual right be assignable to a non-party? 
English law’s answer to this question is complex, and many of its rules are 
difficult to justify. In some respects, the law appears unreasonably pro-
assignment, whereas sometimes it denies assignability to rights that should 
be assignable. This article contends that, in developing the law of 
assignability, the judiciary and Parliament have relied on a series of 
dubious ideas that deviate from the law’s usual approach to contracts, and 
the current law rests partly on intuitive policy rationales that do not 
withstand scrutiny. The main aim of the article is to propose a new 
framework for thinking about the law of assignability that is more closely 
aligned with general ideas about contract law. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The transfer of a contractual right from a party to a non-party is a common 
occurrence. Transferability facilitates a host of commercial practices, 
including receivables financing, the creation and trading of intermediated 
securities, and debt collection. The main body of legal doctrine that makes 
transferability possible is the law of assignment. 1  In recent years, a 
burgeoning body of doctrinal scholarship has begun the tasks of uncovering 
and attempting to solve its many mysteries.2 Looming large among these 
mysteries is assignability—when can contractual rights be assigned, and 
when can’t they?  
The main outlines of the current law of assignability of contractual 
rights can be quickly stated. 3  First, contractual rights are generally 
 
1 The other main body of doctrine enabling the transfer of rights created by contract is the 
law of negotiable instruments, which are uncontroversially transferable.  
2 The most comprehensive scholarly treatment of the topic is G. Tolhurst, The Assignment 
of Contractual Rights, 2nd edn (Oxford 2016). Other especially significant recent 
contributions include G.J. Tolhurst and J.W. Carter, “Prohibitions on Assignment: A 
Choice to be Made” (2014) 73 C.L.J. 405; J. Edelman and S. Elliott, “Two Conceptions of 
Equitable Assignment” (2015) 131 L.Q.R. 228; M. Bridge, “The Nature of Assignment and 
Non-Assignment Clauses” (2016) 132 L.Q.R. 47. 
3 Useful overall summaries of the current law of assignability of contractual rights include 
H. Beale (gen. ed.), Chitty on Contracts, 33rd ed. (London 2016) ch. 19 (chapter ed.: A. 
Burrows); A. Tettenborn, “Problems in Assignment Law” in A. Burrows and E. Peel (eds.), 
Contract Formation and Parties (Oxford 2010). 
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assignable 4  unless, exceptionally, they are classified as “personal”; for 
example, the rights of a publisher against an author are assumed to be 
personal and hence non-assignable. 5  Second, rights to payment are not 
considered personal and are hence assignable. 6  Third, while contracting 
parties are officially free to agree to limit the assignability of the rights they 
create, clauses restricting assignment are often viewed with suspicion. Most 
obviously, recent legislative intervention renders many such clauses 
ineffective where they purport to bar transfers of rights to payment in 
exchange for goods and services (“receivables”).7 Fourth, some assignments 
are void because they are contrary to public policy. In particular, an 
assignment of a claim for unliquidated damages for breach of contract is 
only valid if the recipient has a “genuine commercial interest” in receiving 
the assignment; otherwise the assignment savours of maintenance and 
champerty.8 
This article contends that each of these four of these propositions is 
problematic. In so doing, it draws on the persuasive work of critics of some 
of these particular rules.9 But many of the rules have their defenders in the 
academic literature,10 and the law shows only fleeting signs of improvement. 
This article seeks to go further than previous work by reconsidering the law 
of assignability from an entirely fresh economic and legal perspective.11 A 
fresh perspective is needed because the existing body of doctrine rests a 
 
4 Mulkerrins v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2003] UKHL 41, [2003] 1 W.L.R. 1937, at [13], 
per Lord Millett: “The general rule is that the benefit of a contract may be assigned to a 
third party without the consent of the other contracting party”.  
5 Chitty on Contracts, para 19-056.  
6 Ibid. 
7 Business Contract Terms (Assignment of Receivables) Regulations 2018.  
8 Trendtex Trading Corp. v Credit Suisse [1982] A.C. 679.  
9  E.g. G. McCormack, “Debts and Non-Assignment Clauses” [2000] J.B.L. 422; G. 
McMeel, “The Modern Law of Assignment: Public Policy and Contractual Restrictions on 
Transferability” [2004] L.M.C.L.Q. 483; A. Tettenborn, “Assignment of Rights to 
Compensation” [2007] L.M.C.L.Q. 392.  
10 See e.g. O. Akseli, “Contractual Prohibitions on Assignment of Receivables: An English 
and UN Perspective” [2009] J.B.L. 650; H. Beale, L. Gullifer, and S. Paterson, “A Case for 
Interfering with Freedom of Contract? An Empirically-Informed Study of Bans on 
Assignment” [2016] J.B.L. 203.  
11 In this respect I agree with Andrew Tettenborn’s claim that “lawyers in England have 
never developed a coherent theory of why there should be limitations on assignment”. 
Tettenborn, “Assignment of Rights to Compensation”, p. 401. However, as will be apparent 
below, I do not agree with Tettenborn’s framing of the issue (why assume that the question 
is whether there should be limitations on assignment as opposed to permissions to assign?). 
See section III.C below. 
 3  
whole set of faulty assumptions that provide spurious justifications for 
particular rules. One of these assumptions is that, as a default matter, 
assignability is not a term of the contract but is instead governed by extra-
contractual rules. 12  Moreover, in seeking to formulate these extra-
contractual rules, many judges and scholars rely on the conceptual claim 
that contractual rights (or some subset of contractual rights) are “property” 
and that they should therefore be transferable. 13  Others supporting 
assignability make the policy claim that economic considerations generally 
favour transferability over non-transferability, such that a policy in favour of 
assignability “go[es] to the root of freedom and sanctity of contract which 
are cornerstones of market based economies”.14 The case law on assignment 
is also occasionally haunted by a recurring error of statutory interpretation 
whereby judges believe that the creation of statutory form of assignment 
makes assignable rights that would otherwise be non-assignable.15 While 
each of these four faulty assumptions pushes towards assignability, a fifth 
one—that maintenance and champerty restrict the assignability of damages 
claims—pulls the courts in the direction of invalidating some assignments.16 
Only when these assumptions are cleared away can the law of assignability 
of contractual rights be put on a secure and rational footing. 
To be clear, this article concerns the transfer of rights against 
contractual promisors.17 In a fully effective assignment, after notice is given 
to the promisor, the assignee is entitled to stand in the shoes of the original 
promisee and to bring suit against the promisor for alleged breaches of 
contract. The issue, then, is when a contractual promisor can be brought 
before a court by a non-party to answer an allegation of breach of contract. 
The word “assignment” is used in English law to refer not only to such 
transfers, but also to transactions that grant a proprietary interest in the 
proceeds or “fruits” of contractual performance without transferring a right 
to sue the promisor.18 That will be the limited effect of an assignment where, 
 
12 Section III.A below. 
13 Section III.B. below. 
14 Akseli, “Contractual Prohibitions”, at p. 662. See section III.C below. 
15 Section III.D below. 
16 Section III.E below. 
17 In referring to assignments as “transfers” of contractual rights in a functional way that 
includes both ordinary equitable and statutory assignments, I adopt the standard view, 
rather than Edelman and Elliott’s contention that an equitable assignment nvolves the 
creation of a new right that encumbers the assignor’s right. See Edelman and Elliott, “Two 
Conceptions”; compare Tolhurst, The Assignment of Contractual Rights.  
18  See R. Goode, “Inalienable Rights?” (1979) 42 M.L.R. 553, 554. The line between 
assignments that transfer a right to sue and those that transfer only a right to the proceeds or 
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for example, the promisor is not notified of the assignment before 
performing her contractual obligations. Promisors will generally be 
indifferent to what happens to the fruits of their contractual performance 
after they have performed,19 but, as explained below, they will often care 
very much who is able to assert rights against them. The two issues—rights 
to sue the promisor and entitlements to proceeds—are distinct, and this 
article is concerned with the effects of purported assignment on the legal 
position of the promisor. 
The current law of assignability is in such a poor state that it is better not 
to start with a detailed analysis of the current rules; no coherent approach 
will emerge from such an exercise. The article instead proceeds as follows. 
Part II stands outside current doctrine and sets forth basic principles for 
determining when rights should be assignable. Part III identifies five 
assumptions or arguments present in the case law and academic literature on 
assignment but inconsistent with the principles established in Part II. In Part 
IV, the article explains some particular problems with the current law that 
flow from the mistaken assumptions explored in Part III.  
II. ASSIGNABILITY FROM FIRST PRINCIPLES 
To understand assignability, we need first to understand why parties to 
contracts might wish to make the rights they create assignable or non-
assignable (section A). Having done so, we will be in a position to approach 
the question of what courts should do when faced with express party 
agreement on the issue (section B), and to think about what courts should do 
when the parties have made no such provision (section C).  
A. The Parties’ Competing Interests20 
Promisees naturally tend to prefer assignability. The possibility of effecting 
 
performance is sometimes difficult to draw and was muddied to some extent during the 
discussion of the Court of Appeal in First Abu Dhabi Bank PJSC v BP Oil Ltd. [2018] 
EWCA Civ 14. See P.G. Turner, “Prohibitions on Assignment: Intellectualism v. Law” 
(2018) 134 L.Q.R. 532. 
19  But see McCormack, “Debts and Non-Assignment Clauses”, at p. 438, arguing that 
promisors may have legitimate reasons to invalidate assignments even as between assignee 
and assignor. 
20  The discussion here is more comprehensive than previous accounts, but draws on 
McCormack, “Debts and Non-Assignment Clauses”, pp. 424-26; P.G. Turner, “Legal 
Assignment of Rights of Restricted Assignability” [2008] L.M.C.L.Q. 306, 313; R. Goode, 
“Contractual Prohibitions Against Assignment” [2009] L.M.C.L.Q. 300, 302-03; J. Kramer, 
“When Should Contracts Be Assignable? An Economic Analysis” (2004) Harvard Law and 
Economics Discussion Paper No. 484 (available on SSRN). 
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a unilateral transfer of rights expands a promisee’s options and will increase 
the value of those rights, though the extent of that increase depends on the 
particular circumstances. Where the obligation is to pay money and the 
promisor is unwilling to perform, the promisee might wish to transfer her 
rights to someone else who makes it her business to collect debts. The debt-
collector will not pay the promisee the full value of the debt, but will save 
the promisee the trouble and expense of pursuing it. Transferring the right to 
sue may also shield the promisee from bad publicity; an international bank 
that has loaned money to a struggling developing country, for example, may 
wish to avoid being seen to enforce the loan. Assignment will allow the 
bank to recover some portion of its investment while avoiding the 
reputational cost of squeezing a sympathetic debtor. 
Further, assignability allows a promisee who wants cash now and who 
holds rights to future payment against her customers to use those payment 
rights for financing. The promisee can confer a security interest in the 
payment rights as a condition of receiving a loan from a non-party; she may 
also simply sell her rights to a non-party. As noted above, the transfer of a 
right to sue the promisor requires the promisor to be notified, but many 
promisees would prefer to keep their financing arrangements private. In 
such cases the funds can be obtained through non-notification invoice 
discounting, which confers on the financier a right to the proceeds in the 
promisee’s hands. But where the financier is particularly concerned with the 
promisee’s solvency or the promisee prefers the financier to chase payment, 
the promisor can be notified and a right to sue can be given to the financier; 
this kind of financing transaction is known in the trade as “factoring” and 
involves assignment in the fullest sense of the term.  
Receivables financing is a relatively simple form of transaction, but 
financial markets have used assignability to create transferable assets of 
increasing complexity. In securitization, for example, a corporate entity is 
created to receive assignments of various kinds of contractual rights, which 
may include residential mortgages, commercial mortgages, loans, and bonds. 
The corporate entity then issues securities in itself to investors. Another 
motivation for assignment is that a promisee may wish to be able to sell 
some part of its business to someone else or to another member of its 
corporate group.  
Promisors, on the other hand, will tend to oppose assignability. Other 
things being equal, they prefer to retain control over the identity of those 
who can assert contractual rights against them. Most obviously, the very 
nature of the promisor’s contractual performance sometimes depends on the 
identity of the right-holder, and it could become more onerous if another 
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party could be substituted at the whim of the promisee. An insurer’s 
willingness to cover a given risk and the premiums it charges in exchange 
for doing so are typically calculated with reference to the risk posed by the 
original policy-holder; this calculation would be frustrated if, for example, a 
car insurance policy could simply be transferred to a riskier driver.  
But even where the thing to be done is unchanged, the identity of the 
person to whom it is owed is often important to the promisor. For one thing, 
non-assignability removes the risk that the promisor will perform for the 
wrong party. Where, for example, a debt claim against the promisor has 
been validly assigned and the promisor has been notified of the assignment, 
payment to the promisee will not discharge the promisor’s debt, exposing 
the promisor to the risk of having to pay twice.21 Where the promisor is a 
large organization, the risk of losing track of the proper payee is a major 
concern and will sometimes push the promisor to develop costly 
bureaucratic systems for keeping track of assignments. Additionally, a 
successful assignment of which the promisor has been notified will limit the 
extent to which the promisor can invoke rights of set-off of unrelated claims 
arising after notification.22 This may be an important consideration where 
the promisor and promisee are engaged in a series of mutual dealings under 
separate contracts.  
These reasons are important, but they do not adequately explain what 
one judge has called “the genuine commercial interest of a party of ensuring 
that contractual relations are only with the person he has selected as the 
other party to the contract and no one else”.23  To fully comprehend the 
significance of this interest requires an understanding of the broader context 
in which contracts are included, an understanding assisted by relational 
contract theory.24 As the relationalists point out, contractual relationships 
are embedded in wider relationships between the parties. 25  The written 
contract between the parties seeks to fix many of their performance 
 
21 William Brandt’s Sons & Co. v Dunlop Rubber Co. [1905] A.C. 454. 
22 Business Computers v Anglo-African Leasing Ltd. [1977] 1 W.L.R. 578.  
23 Don King Productions Inc v Warren [2000] Ch 291, 319, per Lightman J. 
24 The idea of a “relational contract” has recently been imported into English contract law 
doctrine; a term of good faith and fair dealing is now implied into certain kinds of contracts 
like joint ventures, distributorships, and franchise agreements. Al Nehayan v Kent [2018] 
EWHC 333 (Comm), [2018] 1 C.L.C. 216. To a greater or lesser extent, however, all 
contracts have some relational element. D. Campbell, “The Relational Constitution of 
Discrete Contract” in D. Campbell and P. Vincent-Jones (eds), Contract and Economic 
Organisation: Socio-legal Initiatives (Aldershot 1996). 
25 I.R. Macneil, The New Social Contract: An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations 
(New Haven 1980).  
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obligations, but a full specification of those obligations is in many cases 
impossible. The parties thus rely on post-contractual co-operation to modify 
their mutual obligations by agreement during the course of performance. For 
example, a party who meets unexpected difficulties in performing may seek 
the other party’s forbearance in enforcing her rights. Whether cooperation is 
forthcoming will often depend on the identity of the party holding the right. 
The need for cooperation in light of unforeseen circumstances, then, leaves 
a promisor vulnerable to opportunistic behaviour by a right-holder who 
declines to cooperate and seeks to enforce its strict legal rights. Even if the 
courts attempt to prevent such opportunism, as urged by some relational 
contract scholars,26 a risk remains that litigation will be too expensive or 
that the court will fail to understand the parties’ relationship. For these 
reasons, promisors are wise to choose their promisees carefully, and will 
prefer to keep legal rights out of the hands of parties not constrained by the 
parties’ relationship or by membership in a broader network. 27  This 
empirical story does not in itself dictate the law’s response, but it explains 
why promisors may not wish contractual rights against them to be 
transferable to third parties without their approval.  
The main upshot of this lengthy (but surely not exhaustive) list of pros 
and cons is that one cannot generalise about whether transferability or non-
transferability will serve the joint interests of the parties. It depends on the 
circumstances. In a long-term contract, for example, the promisor might be 
particularly concerned to prevent assignment to a non-party. The contract’s 
length makes it more likely that unforeseen circumstances will arise, and the 
written contract will be inadequate to deal with those circumstances. 
Equally, however, the contract’s long-term nature might lead the promisee 
to wish to have the power to transfer the right to someone else when the 
promisee’s plans or priorities change. From an economic standpoint, there is 
no general reason for the parties to favour transferability over non-
transferability (or vice versa).  
 
26  E.g. S. Macaulay, “The Real Deal and the Paper Deal: Empirical Pictures of 
Relationships, Complexity and the Urge for Transparent Simple Rules” (2003) 66 M.L.R. 
44. 
27 Cf. Turner, “Prohibitions on Assignment: Intellectualism v Law”, at p. 532 (“the law 
presumes that obligors are indifferent as to the identity of those whom they must deal with, 
regarding their contractual obligations and rights” though “evidence that the counterparty’s 
identity mattered to the obligor can rebut the presumption”). 
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B. Express Agreements on Assignability  
In normal circumstances, the best evidence as to what serves the parties’ 
joint interests is their express agreement on the matter, if there is one. 
Clauses dealing with the assignability of rights are a standard element of 
many—perhaps most—written contracts. Such clauses may expressly state 
that one or both parties’ rights will be assignable. They may prohibit 
assignment entirely, or prohibit it generally with exceptions for limited 
classes of assignees. Thus, for example, the commonly accepted standard-
form provisions for letters of credit, the Uniform Customs and Practice on 
Documentary Credits (UCP 600), provide that the right to payment under a 
letter of credit is not transferable in the absence of the issuing bank’s 
express consent.28 The suite of standard form contracts most often used in 
the U.K. construction industry, the J.C.T., contains by default a bar on 
assignment29 but now also provides the parties with the option to permit the 
developer to assign its rights against the builder to a buyer or a tenant of the 
property.30 In general, contract law (in agreement with economic analysis) 
assumes that the parties to contracts—especially commercial parties—
would only agree to a provision if it served their joint interests at the time 
they entered into the contract. Or, at least, the law takes the position that the 
parties are usually better placed to decide what serves their interests than a 
judge or arbitrator deciding the matter after the fact. 31  In the area of 
assignability, as elsewhere, freedom of contract should usually prevail.  
But freedom of contract does not and should not always prevail. The law 
recognises two basic categories of reasons not to give effect to an expressed 
agreement: the need to protect a party to the contract (known in the 
economic literature as “paternalism”) and the need to protect third parties to 
the agreement (“externalities”).32 To take the first of these reasons first: 
contract terms are sometimes imposed by one party on the other rather than 
 
28 U.C.P. 600, art. 38(a). This provision does not affect the ability to assign the proceeds of 
the credit. Ibid., art. 39.  
29 J.C.T. Design and Build Contract, Design and Build Contract, 2016 edn. (London 2016), 
s. 7.1. A prior version of this provision was the subject of the litigation in Linden Gardens 
Ltd v Lenesta Sludge [1994] 1 A.C. 85. 
30 J.C.T. Design and Build Contract, s. 7.2. 
31 E.g. Watford Electronics Ltd v Sanderson CFL Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 317; [2001] 1 All 
ER (Comm) 696, at [55], per Chadwick L.J.: experienced commercial parties “should be 
taken to be the best judge on the question whether the terms of the agreement are 
reasonable”. 
32 See P. Cserne, “Freedom of Contract (and Economic Analysis)” in A. Marciano, and G.B. 
Ramello (eds.) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics (New York 2018). 
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emerging from conscious bargaining or genuine agreement. The law 
accordingly makes large-scale exceptions to freedom of contract in 
employment and consumer cases; more rarely does the law engage in 
paternalism in favour of a business party. Without evidence of 
misrepresentation, undue influence, duress, or breach of fiduciary duty, 
English law only exceptionally permits a commercial party to avoid a term 
to which it has given its apparent assent, 33 and in particular it refuses to 
accept any general doctrine of inequality of bargaining power 34  or 
unconscionability. 35  Still, even in a commercial case, a provision 
authorizing assignment might reflect the greater market power of the 
promisee; likewise, a contractual term prohibiting or limiting assignment 
may be the result of a promisor’s ability to dictate the terms on a relatively 
less sophisticated or powerful promise. Where these circumstances are 
present, the law might consider making exceptions to freedom of contract to 
protect the weaker party. 
Assessing the significance of externalities for the enforceability of 
assignment or non-assignment clauses requires a more explicitly economic 
approach. Some scholars may contend that economic reasoning is somehow 
foreign to the common law of contracts or that “policy reasoning” is 
something only for the legislature. In fact, economic arguments already 
permeate the law of assignability. As explained below, the case law is full of 
statements about the need to reconcile freedom of contract with the freedom 
of markets, the economic benefits of making assets alienable, and public 
policy concerns about “trafficking in litigation”. These discussions, however, 
do not systematically analyse the economic considerations at stake.  
In particular, in debates over non-assignment clauses, enthusiasts for 
markets in contractual rights often seem to give equal weight to, on the one 
hand, the interests of non-parties who would like to be able to acquire 
contractual rights, and, on the other hand, the interests of contractual 
promisors who have bargained for the right to veto such acquisitions. 
Standing alone, however, a potential assignee’s desire to acquire contractual 
rights against someone else does not need to be accorded any independent 
weight in the economic calculus. That is because, so long as the promisee is 
able to stand up for its own interests, the third party’s interest is already 
represented at the original bargaining table attended by the promisor and 
 
33 The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, however, provides a clear example.  
34 See National Westminster Bank plc v Morgan [1985] A.C. 686, 708. 
35 See Union Eagle v Golden Achievement [1997] A.C. 514, 519. 
 10  
promisee.36 If making the right in question transferable would increase the 
value of the right, the promisee already has an incentive to bargain for an 
assignability clause (or, where the default position is assignability, to refuse 
to assent to a clause restricting assignment). For this reason, Lord Browne-
Wilkinson was fundamentally correct to state in Linden Gardens that there 
is no reason why a contractual prohibition on assignment should be held 
contrary to public policy.37  
Admittedly, there is a much weaker but genuinely independent third-
party interest that is not fully represented at the bargaining table between the 
promisor and promisee: an informational interest. 38  There is nothing 
economically dubious about restricting assignability, but the possibility of 
doing so will sometimes affect the transactions of others who do wish to 
make their contractual rights assignable. Suppose A and B have agreed that 
A’s contractual rights against B should be assignable, while C and D have 
agreed that C’s rights against D should be non-assignable. A then 
approaches E seeking to transfer its rights against B to E. The problem for E 
is that he will have to discern whether A’s contract with B is or is not like 
C’s contract with D. The possibility of an effective non-assignment clause 
means that potential assignees must guard against the risk that the rights 
they are acquiring might turn out to be ineffective against the promisor. 
They will have to inspect the contractual agreements that create the rights 
they are acquiring, or increase the cost of the transaction to the promisee as 
compensation for this risk, or take further precautions against the risk (for 
example, securing a personal guarantee from the officers of a corporate 
promisee).  
This diffuse market interest, however, is weak when it comes up against 
the interests of large swathes of promisors who have valid reasons to veto a 
change in the identity of the party able to sue them for breach of contract 
and who have specifically bargained for the insertion of such a clause into 
the contract. Moreover, the burden on prospective assignees should not be 
overstated; assignment clauses are easy to spot and a party considering 
whether to take an assignment of a contractual right will need to satisfy 
herself of the content of that right anyway, necessitating an inspection of the 
contractual documents. The proper response to the transferee’s concerns 
about possible non-assignment clauses is that she should read the written 
contract that creates the rights she is acquiring before acquiring those 
 
36  See T.W. Merrill and H.E. Smith, “Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property” 
(2001) 110 Yale L.J. 1, 30.  
37 Linden Gardens, [1994] 1 A.C. 85, 107. 
38 See Merrill and Smith, “Optimal Standardization”, pp. 31-34. 
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rights,39 or take the risk that the promisor has validly bargained to prevent 
assignment of a right to sue.  
C. Assignability in the Absence of Party Agreement 
Assignability clauses are extremely common in written contracts. Still, the 
parties may not have made a provision on the issue, especially in the case of 
an oral agreement or a relatively short, informal written contract. If there is 
gap in the contract on the issue of assignability, and the validity of a 
purported assignment is contested, the law has to provide an answer.40  
English law uses a variety of techniques to fill gaps in contracts. The 
easiest way to justify a gap-filling solution is to invoke the presumed intent 
of the parties. Courts faced with a gap in the parties’ contract may ask what 
these particular parties have tacitly agreed to, or, more realistically, what 
they would have agreed to had they turned their attention to the matter; the 
relevant legal techniques are contractual construction and the implication of 
terms in fact.41 In the interests of making the law more predictable, the law 
may instead ask this question at a higher level of generality: what would 
serve the interests of parties to this class of contract in general? The result of 
such an inquiry is known in the economic literature as an “untailored 
majoritarian default”42; in English law, some terms implied in law are best 
understood in this way. In the specific context of assignability, predictability 
may be more significant than in many other contractual contexts, so it is 
likely to be sensible to categorize different classes of contract as either 
assignable by default or non-assignable by default, rather than to make that 
judgment on a case-by-case basis.  
Aside from looking to hypothetical party agreement, the law might find 
other sufficiently compelling reasons for filling gaps in contracts. To the 
extent it departs from a judgment as to what these parties or parties more 
generally would have agreed, such a policy-based default can be based on 
the same kinds of arguments discussed above: paternalism or third-party 
interests. In English law, some terms implied in law fall to be justified on 
that basis.43 In the specific area of assignability, too, the choice of default 
 
39 That, at least, was the response of Judge Richard Posner to an assignee who claimed to 
have taken an assignment of a right made non-assignable by the parties. Bank of America v. 
Moglia, 330 F.3d 942 (7th Cir 2003).  
40 I. Ayres and R. Gertner, “Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts” (1989) 99 Yale L.J. 87. 
41 See H. Collins, “Implied Terms: The Foundation in Good Faith and Fair Dealing” (2014) 
67 C.L.P. 297. 
42 Ayres and Gertner, “Filling Gaps”, p. 127. 
43 E. Peden, “Policy Concerns behind Implication of Terms in Law” (2001) 117 L.Q.R. 459. 
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rules need not to be solely limited to trying to determine what the parties 
would have agreed, though in a commercial context that is usually likely to 
be the sensible approach.  
III. FAULTY ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING THE CURRENT LAW 
The previous section provides a framework for thinking about when 
contractual rights to sue should be assignable. In outline, the law should 
seek a result in line with promisor-promisee intent except where a 
compelling argument based on paternalism or externalities requires a 
different result. This section examines a series of assumptions and 
arguments, present to a greater or lesser degree in English law, that do not 
fit with this framework.  
A. Assignability Depends on Extracontractual Rules of Law  
One might think that the identity of the person who can sue under a contract 
would be considered a term of that contract—one of its most basic terms. 
But unless the parties have made an express provision on the issue, the rules 
of assignability are conceptualized not as terms but as extracontractual 
rules.44 Occasionally courts speak as if the availability of assignment in the 
absence of an express provision depends on construction or implication,45 
but generally the only role of party agreement is to alter a rule superimposed 
on the contracting parties. The difficulty with this way of proceeding is that 
it avoids frank engagement with the potential clash between the contract that 
creates the right and the rules governing its transferability. In particular, 
why should a promisee generally have the unilateral power to confer a right 
to sue on a third party where she has not expressly bargained for such a 
power?  
As suggested at the end of the last section, the only way to provide a 
justification for an assignability default in line with contract law’s basic 
ideas is through a convincing implied term analysis. English law recognises 
two kinds of implied terms: terms implied in fact based on the presumed 
intentions of the parties to a particular contract, and terms implied by law 
into categories of contract.46 As Michael Bridge has pointed out, however, 
 
44 Mulkerrins v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2003] UKHL 41, [2003] 1 W.L.R. 1937, at [13], 
per Lord Millett.  
45 See Tolhurst v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd. [1903] A.C. 414, 
420, where Lord Macnaghten justified his decision in favour of assignability by saying that 
“the plain intention of the parties” was to allow subsequent owners of the cement business 
to assert rights under the contract.  
46 Geys v Société Générale [2012] UKSC 63, [2013] 1 A.C. 523, at [55]. 
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the current general rule of assignability is impossible to explain as a term 
implied in fact,47 under either the “officious bystander” or the “business 
efficacy” test. The parties to some contracts might suppress an officious 
bystander who asked them whether the rights they were creating should be 
transferable without the promisor’s consent, but that is likely to be true in 
only a minority of cases. Likewise, it is only in unusual contexts that 
assignability is necessary to give business efficacy to the contract between 
the original contracting parties. The assignability default rule is plainly not 
based on an attempt to capture the presumed intent of the particular parties 
to a specific contract; only rarely can it be said that “the contract would lack 
commercial or practical coherence” if assignment were not possible.48 And, 
anyway, the assignability default is not based on the circumstances or 
intentions of the particular parties to the contract; it applies to large classes 
of contractual rights—to contractual rights in general, with the class of 
“personal” contractual rights exempted.  
To the extent that the assignability defaults are to be considered terms of 
the contract between the parties, then, they must be terms implied in law or 
“standardized terms”.49 Certainly, the fit seems much better than is the case 
with terms implied in fact. But can the current rules be justified in line with 
the law’s general approach to terms implied in law? That depends in part on 
what the law’s general approach is. A restrictive view, that has sometimes 
tempted the courts, is that where judicial implication of terms is concerned, 
a term may only be implied in law where it a necessary incident of the kind 
of contract concerned. 50 But the current default, except in the unusual case 
of “personal” rights, makes little effort to distinguish among different kinds 
of contract, and assignability is hardly a necessary incident of contracts in 
general. An alternative—and more attractive—approach to the judicial 
implication of terms in law eschews “the elusive concept of necessity” and 
recognises that “the existence and scope of standardised implied terms raise 
questions of reasonableness, fairness and the balancing of competing policy 
considerations”.51 This looser approach may better reflect what courts have 
been doing in the area of terms implied in law,52 and it certainly reflects 
 
47 Bridge, “Non-Assignment Clauses”, at p. 54.  
48 See Geys [2012] UKSC 63, at [55].  
49 See Malik v Bank of Credit and Commerce International S.A. [1998] A.C. 20, 45. 
50 Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] A.C. 239, 254.  
51 Crossley v Faithful & Gould Holdings Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 293, [2004] 4 All E.R. 447.  
52  Geys [2012] UKSC 63, at [56], per Lady Hale: “There is much to be said for that 
approach, given the way in which those terms have developed over the years”. 
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legislative practice in adding terms to contract. We will return to the 
supposed policy basis for preferring assignability below. For the moment, 
however, the point is just that, by holding that the default rules of 
assignability are not terms at all, the current law ignores the potential clash 
with the parties’ contract. As Bridge notes, the law’s silence concerning the 
existence of an implied term comes “close to an admission that assignment 
is not to be reconciled with contract at all”.53 
B. Contractual Rights are Property and Thus Assignable 
A tenacious idea in assignment law attributes independent significance to 
whether contractual rights are “property”. The idea is that if contractual 
rights, or some subset of contractual rights, are labelled “property”, that 
means they must be transferable. Much of the debate among doctrinal 
scholars of assignability concerns whether contract rights are or are not also 
property rights; the answer to this question is then thought to have 
consequences for the assignability of contractual rights.54  
The attribution of independent significance to the conceptual 
classification is not just an academic practice; it has long influenced the 
decisions of courts. This is most obviously the case where the contractual 
right concerned is a claim to an agreed sum of money. Claims for agreed 
sums of money were vindicated at common law through the action for debt, 
which was historically viewed as being in some sense “proprietary”.55 That 
did not mean the common law recognised assignment; indeed, the common 
law resisted assignability for centuries. But after equity facilitated 
assignments of debt claims, and especially after the recognition of statutory 
assignment, it became commonplace to say that such claims were a form of 
property, and to attribute assignability to the proprietary character of 
“choses in action”. For example, in Fitzroy v. Cave it was stated that “in all 
Courts a debt must be regarded as a piece of property capable of legal 
assignment in the same sense as a bale of goods”.56 This reasoning was 
taken to justify the extraordinary conclusion that an assignment taken for the 
sole purpose of bankrupting the promisor was effective. More recently, in 
the Camdex case, Hobhouse L.J. stated that “[d]ebts are a species of 
 
53 Bridge, “Non-Assignment Clauses”, at p. 54.  
54 See ibid., at p. 47: “The assignment of things in action sits precariously between contract 
law and property law”.  
55 F. Pollock and W. Maitland, A History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I, Vol. 
II (Cambridge 1895), 204-07.  
56 [1905] 2 K.B. 364, 373.  
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property recognised before 1873 in equity and since that date both in law 
and equity. Like other species of property they may be transferred to another 
and the legal rights which are incidents of that property may be exercised by 
the new owner of the property”.57 This proprietary character of a claim to an 
agreed sum of money was strong enough to override any concerns about 
champerty and maintenance that would otherwise have endangered the 
assignment in Camdex. Again, in Barbados Trust v Bank of Zambia, 
discussed below, the Court of Appeal framed the question as one concerning 
whether the contested clause was “an attempt to place fetters on the 
unencumbered property of an individual”58 and one judge stated that “since 
one is concerned with the question whether a restriction should be placed on 
the transfer of a piece of property, an acknowledged debt, the court should 
be slow to contemplate that the parties ever intended such to be within the 
prohibition”.59 
These statements have it backwards. They assume that a certain class of 
rights are “property” and should therefore be transferable. But what matters 
is when contractual rights are transferable. Once we have figured that out, 
we will then be able to decide whether and when, for this particular purpose, 
it is appropriate in this limited sense to say that some contractual rights are 
being treated like (most forms of) property. Or, if designating a right as 
“property” necessarily makes it transferable, then contractual rights should 
(sometimes) not be designated property rights.  
C. Economic Considerations Favour Assignability in General 
Though the idea that contractual rights (or, more narrowly, debt claims) are 
property and hence assignable is sometimes taken seriously on its own terms, 
it is often meant to express an instrumental or policy justification in favour 
of assignability. 60  In particular, in the case of real property, legal rules 
sometimes invalidate contractual restrictions on alienation. The argument 
that contractual rights are property may then be taken as a claim that 
analogous public policy considerations require them to be transferable.  
 
57 Camdex International Ltd. v Bank of Zambia (No. 1) [1998] 1 Q.B. 22. 
58 Barbados Trust Co. Ltd. v Bank of Zambia [2007] EWCA Civ 148, [2007] 1 C.L.C. 434, 
at [7].  
59 Ibid., at [43], per Waller L.J. See also ibid., at [88], where Rix L.J. refers to the debt as a 
form of “property” in the course of concluding that the right-holder could declare a trust 
over it.  
60  W. Day, “Non-Assignment Clauses—the Statutory Solution” (2019) 135 L.Q.R. 205 
(“An overly-simplistic argument that contractual rights are property rights and that property 
rights should be capable of alienation has given way to a more refined approach”.).  
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More directly, without insisting that contractual rights are property, 
proponents of assignability can simply make an “argument about liquidity 
and cost of credit and the need for the workings of private law to foster the 
former and lower the latter”. 61  The judgment of Rix L.J. in Barbados 
Trust—mentioned above and discussed further below—provides a 
particularly clear example of the claim that public policy requires 
assignability. Expressing some degree of hostility to the choice of 
contracting parties to make contractual rights non-assignable, Rix L.J. stated 
that it was important that “financial assets are not too readily made 
inalienable especially where markets regularly provide liquidity for the 
trading of them”. 62 If the parties to contracts could decide without any 
limitation to prohibit assignment, “the public interest in freedom of contract 
and the freedom of markets could be severely prejudiced”.63  
A similar claim is made explicitly by Professor Goode, who notes that 
rules against alienation “have traditionally been directed to physical assets 
in general and land in particular; but in modern commerce, transactions 
involving physical assets are dwarfed in value by dealings in pure 
intangibles, particularly debts, intermediated securities and derivatives”.64 
Based on these practices, Professor Goode says that “[i]t is thus important 
that legal rules based on freedom of contract do not impair the free flow of 
intangibles in the stream of trade”.65  Professor Goode’s watery metaphor 
stands in direct opposition to Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s claim in Linden 
Gardens that any policy in favour of alienability simply does not apply to 
contractual rights.66 In the case of land “there is a defined and limited supply 
of the commodity … but no such reason can apply to contractual rights: 
there is no public need for a market in choses in action”.67 In economic 
terms, as explained above, Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s view is fundamentally 
correct. Where the parties have freely agreed to create non-assignable rights, 
there is no valid economic case based on externalities for making them 
assignable.  
The assumption that economic arguments generally favour 
transferability is also invoked to support a default rule of assignability. 
 
61 Akseli, “Contractual Prohibitions”, at p. 662. 
62 Barbados Trust [2007] EWCA Civ 148, at [112].  
63 Ibid. 
64 Goode, “Contractual Prohibitions”, p. 300.  
65 Ibid. 
66 Linden Gardens [1994] 1 A.C. 85, 107.  
67 Ibid. 
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Andrew Tettenborn, in an otherwise highly perceptive piece on the 
assignability of damages claims, states in support of a claim that intangible 
rights should be generally be assignable that “just as welfare is maximized if 
tangible assets end up in the hands of those who value them the most, so 
also with intangibles”.68 This statement seem to rests on the assumption that 
the promisor’s often-substantial reasons to avoid assignment are pervasively 
(rather than only sometimes) outweighed by the promisee’s reasons to want 
it. Similarly, Tettenborn’s claim that intangible rights will be “effectively 
sterilized” if they are inalienable pays insufficient heed to the fact that, as 
explained above, the value of the original contract often depends in part on 
the inalienability of rights arising under it.69  
D. The Difference Between Equitable and Statutory Assignments is 
Significant for Assignability 
English law maintains a confusing distinction between equitable and 
statutory (or “legal”) assignments that can only be understood with 
reference to history. Historically, courts of common law refused to permit 
assignment, with limited exceptions. But courts of equity from the 
seventeenth century onwards took a different view, recognizing assignments 
of both equitable and legal rights. Where the assigned right was one 
recognised by the courts of common law, a court of equity would compel an 
unwilling assignor to bring suit in the common law courts on the assignee’s 
behalf.70 Even before the Judicature Acts, common law courts effectively 
recognised assignments, permitting assignees to control litigation nominally 
brought by assignors. With the fusion of the administration of law and 
equity, assignment was made official, with the recipient of a fully valid 
assignment now able to sue in all courts in her own name, joining the 
assignor as a co-claimant (if she was willing) or as a co-defendant (if she 
was not).  
But Parliament also made a further change, enacting section 25(6) of the 
Judicature Act 1873, which was later repealed and re-enacted as section 136 
of the Law of Property Act 1925. The provision concerns assignments of 
“any debt or other legal thing in action”. Where (i) the assignment is 
absolute, (ii) the assignment is made in writing, and (iii) the promisor has 
been given express notice in writing, the statute provides that the legal right 
 
68 Tettenborn, “Assignment of Rights to Compensation”, at p. 403. 
69 Unlike some others, Tettenborn does not take this claim about sterilization too far; he 
appears to be happy for courts to enforce non-assignment clauses. Ibid., at p. 405.  
70 See Hammond v Messenger (1838) 9 Sim. 327, 59 E.R. 383. 
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to the debt or other legal thing in action passes to the assignee and that the 
assignee is entitled to all remedies for its enforcement. The function of 
section 136 is to provide a mechanism that enables the assignor to drop out 
of the litigation entirely. The requirement of an absolute assignment (as 
opposed to an assignment of part of a claim) is supposed to limit statutory 
assignment to cases where the assignor has no interest in the dispute 
between the assignee and the obligor. Where the assignor retains an interest, 
the assignor (or, in the case of successive assignments, multiple assignors) 
must be named as parties, providing them with notice of the proceedings 
and the ability to influence them. Historically, courts have sometimes been 
willing to dispense with the need to join the assignor even where the 
assignment does not meet the statute’s requirements, where joinder seems 
unnecessary. 71  In practice, then, it makes little difference whether an 
assignment is statutory or equitable.  
The assignability of contractual rights was not supposed to be affected 
by the procedural reform.72 And there is no reason of policy or principle that 
a right unassignable in equity should be assignable where the statutory 
requirements have been met. Nevertheless, there has been a long-running 
tendency to attribute substantive consequences to this procedural reform. 
The mistaken view that section 136 affects assignability appears to have 
crept into the judgment of Hobhouse L.J. in Camdex and to have been 
combined with the property error noted above: “[I]f there is a debt it is a 
species of property and the fact that the debtor disputes it … does not make 
it any the less a debt nor does it provide a basis for failing to give effect to 
section 136 or its predecessor”. 73  Likewise, in a concluding flourish, 
Hobhouse L.J. discerned that “the policy of English law, and section 136, is 
that where debtors are in default judgment should be entered against them in 
favour of the owner of the debt”,74 without explaining where in section 136 
this policy is expressed. Most recently, in Hockin v Royal Bank of Scotland 
the Royal Bank of Scotland sought to argue that section 136 gave it a 
statutory right to assign.75 The argument was rightly rejected by the judge,76 
 
71 See Tolhurst and Carter, “Prohibitions on Assignment”, p. 425 note 64.  
72 Torkington v Magee [1902] 2 K.B. 427, 435, reversed on other grounds, [1903] 1 K.B 
644; Tolhurst v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1902] 2 K.B. 660, 
676-77; Tolhurst v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers (1900) Ltd [1903] A.C. 414, 
424.  
73 Camdex International Ltd v Bank of Zambia (No.1) [1998] Q.B. 22, 33.  
74 Ibid., at p. 39. 
75 [2016] EWHC 925 (Ch), at [34].  
76 Ibid., at [44].  
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but the fact that it was even made goes to show how tenacious the mistaken 
assumption is.  
E. Assigning Claims to Litigate is Inherently Problematic 
The four previous mistaken ideas have all tended to favour assignability, but 
a fifth tends to restrict it. It pops up in cases where, at the time of the 
assignment, it is clear that the promisor will not perform her alleged 
obligations without being sued. Assignments are sometimes held invalid 
because they involve “trafficking in litigation—a type of transaction which, 
under English law, is contrary to public policy”.77 An assignment of a right 
to litigate might be thought to “savour” (i.e. taste) of maintenance (meddling 
in someone else’s litigation) and champerty (meddling in someone else’s 
litigation for a share for the proceeds). An assignee is thought to be 
somewhat like someone who funds another’s litigation in exchange for a cut 
of the proceeds. This is so even though the assignee is suing in his own right 
rather than meddling in someone else’s litigation. In 1967, Parliament 
abolished criminal and tortious liability for champerty and maintenance, but 
expressly preserved any rule of law as to the cases in which a contract 
involving maintenance or champerty is contrary to public policy or illegal.78  
The law’s scepticism about transferring certain causes of action is 
starkly at odds with the more prevalent—though also dubious—view that 
the transferability of contractual rights is by its nature economically 
beneficial. It has begun to seem especially anachronistic in light of changes 
to closely analogous areas of law. Lawyers may now enter into conditional 
fee agreements with their clients, and London now has some of the world’s 
most liberal rules for litigation funding by parties who have no prior 
connection to the claim; such third parties can finance the costs of litigation 
in exchange for a portion of the proceeds without running afoul of the 
prohibition against champerty.  
On closer inspection, the actual problem with champerty is supposed to 
be that the desire to make a profit will encourage the intermeddler to seek 
more damages than she is entitled to, to suppress evidence, and to suborn 
perjury.79 These are undoubtedly bad things. If a link between them and 
assignment could be established it might provide a basis for concluding, as a 
matter of implied intention, that the parties would not have wanted to allow 
assignment in such circumstances (Q: “Do you mean to authorise an activity 
 
77 Trendtex Trading Corp. v Credit Suisse [1982] A.C. 679, 694. 
78 Criminal Law Act 1967, s. 14(2). 
79 Re Trepca Mines Ltd. (No. 2) [1963] Ch. 199, 219-20. 
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that encourages fraud and perjury? A: Of course not!”). But, as Tettenborn 
points out, it is unclear is why an assignee, merely in virtue of being an 
assignee, is more likely to overclaim or commit fraud than the original right-
holder.80 Misconduct in litigation should be punished as it arises, whether 
perpetrated by a contracting party or by an assignee. 
The idea of “trafficking in litigation”, then, does not identify a genuine 
problem with assignments. This point was perhaps recognised by Lady Hale 
when she stated, in upholding an assignment of a cause of action, that 
“‘trafficking’ is a pejorative term which takes the debate no further: it 
simply means trading in something (be it drugs or people) in which it is not 
permissible to trade”.81 As we will see below, however, the idea underlies a 
significant portion of the law on assignability of contractual rights.  
IV. PARTICULAR PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT LAW 
A. Non-Assignment Clauses are not Adequately Respected 
In the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary, freedom of contract 
should prevail here as elsewhere. English law does pay lip-service to 
freedom of contract in assignability. 82  In at least two ways, however, 
freedom of contract does not fully prevail. First, the courts have shown a 
willingness to allow a promisee seemingly bound by a non-assignment 
clause to evade such a clause by declaring itself a trustee of its contractual 
rights for a third party. Second, in the case of receivables, statutory 
intervention explicitly overrides freedom of contract. Each of these legal 
developments is partly premised on mistaken assumptions identified in Part 
III.  
1. A Declaration of Trust Can Seemingly Evade a Non-Assignment Clause  
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Barbados Trust v. Bank of Zambia83 
has already been subject to a great deal of commentary, but its extraordinary 
facts merit repeating. The central bank of Zambia entered into a contract of 
loan whereby various international banks advanced large sums of money to 
finance oil imports in 1985. The relevant contract of loan included a 
complex assignability clause, allowing assignment in certain 
circumstances—but only to “banks or other financial institutions”. As the 
 
80 Tettenborn, “Assignment of Rights to Compensation,” at p. 403. 
81 Massai Aviation Services v Attorney General [2007] UKPC 12. 
82 Linden Gardens [1994] 1 A.C. 85, 107.  
83 [2007] EWCA (Civ) 148. 
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High Court judge pointed out, “[a]ny borrower, but particularly a central 
bank, may be concerned to ensure that its affairs and obligations are known 
and owed to and only enforceable by established and authorised 
institutions”.84 Later, the debt was purportedly assigned to Bank of America, 
clearly a member of the permissible class of assignees. Bank of America, 
however, decided to offload the asset to the distressed debt market. It did 
not assign the loan but instead declared itself a trustee of the debt for 
Barbados Trust. Barbados Trust was not a bank or other financial institution. 
For reasons that need not concern us, the Court of Appeal concluded by a 
majority that the previous assignment to Bank of America was invalid, and 
so it became unnecessary to decide on the validity of the declaration of trust 
in favour of Barbados Trust.  
Two members of the Court of Appeal, however, would have been 
prepared to hold as a matter of contractual construction that the clause 
restricting assignment did not cover declarations of trust. Rix L.J. and 
Waller L.J. concluded that if the parties had wished to bar declarations of 
trust in addition to assignments, they should have done so explicitly.85 Yet 
the same judges agreed that, as the beneficiary of a trust, Barbados Trust 
would have been able to bring a suit against the Bank of Zambia under the 
Vandepitte procedure, whereby the beneficiary of a trust can sue in her own 
name where the trustee is unwilling to bring suit on her behalf.86 Barbados 
Trust, in the majority’s view, could have brought an action directly against 
the Bank of Zambia so long as it joined Bank of America, just as an 
equitable assignee could.  
A declaration of trust is not quite the same thing as an equitable 
assignment.87 But, to the extent that the upshot of a declaration of trust is 
that the beneficiary can bring an action against the promisor, joining the 
trustee as a co-defendant, then the two things are functionally the same.88 As 
 
84 Ibid., at [6].  
85 Ibid., at 451-52, per Waller L.J. 
86 Vandepitte v Preferred Accident Ins. Corp. of New York [1933] A.C. 70, 79. 
87 Edelman and Elliott argue that an equitable assignment is the same thing as a declaration 
of trust. Nevertheless, they suggest that the majority position in Barbados Trust might 
possibly be justified on the basis that the no-assignment clause could be construed only to 
apply to legal assignments. Edelman and Elliott, “Two Views”, at pp. 248–49. That, 
however, does not seem a plausible interpretation of the clause any more than Rix L.J. and 
Waller L.J.’s does. 
88 Turner points out that, unlike an assignee who has given notice to the promisor, a trust 
beneficiary can only sue in exceptional circumstances, including fraud. Turner, 
“Prohibitions on Assignment: Intellectualism v. Law”, at 535-36. But the required 
circumstances are not so exceptional, for they include cases in which the trustee declines to 
bring suit on the beneficiary’s behalf.  
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noted by the High Court judge, by Hooper L.J. in dissent on this point, and 
by a host of critical academic commentators, the effect of this construction 
was to permit the legal result that the non-assignment clause was designed 
to avoid—liability to suit by a party that is not a bank or financial 
institution.89 To conclude that a non-assignment clause does not include a 
declaration of trust is hardly the kind of commercial common-sense 
interpretation that courts are supposed to engage in nowadays.  
Rather than based on a plausible construction of party intent, then, the 
narrowing construction given to the clause in Barbados Trust appears to 
have been inspired by a sense that public policy supported it. Rix L.J.’s 
judgment states this expressly. When discussing the all-important issue of 
whether the beneficiary of a trust could use the Vandepitte procedure to 
bring a direct suit and thereby do the precise thing that the non-assignment 
clause was designed to prevent, Rix L.J. referred to the tension between 
those who (like the Bank of Zambia) wished to decide who could sue them 
and two other groups to whom those interests sometimes needed to yield. 
First, he referred to the “interests of those who seek to arrange their affairs 
on the basis of holding property in trust for others”.90 But people who wish 
to be able to transfer their rights to sue to others can protect themselves by 
refusing to agree to a restriction on assignment or, in the case of a transferee, 
by declining to purchase a right of limited assignability. Second, Rix L.J. 
referred to the “public interest” in alienability. 91  As explained above, 
however, there is no general economic reason to favour alienability over 
inalienability. 
Because it is based on the construction of a “no-assignment” clause, the 
Barbados Trust decision can in principle be overridden by an explicit “no 
trust” clause. Giving further support to the conclusion that the parties to 
contracts see no relevant distinction between assignments and trusts to the 
extent that both confer on the recipient a right to sue the promisor, such “no 
trust” language is apparently being inserted into non-assignment clauses 
now as a matter of course.92 But if, as Rix L.J.’s judgment seems to suggest, 
the decision is really based on public policy, courts may decline to enforce 
 
89 Barbados Trust [2007] EWCA (Civ) 148, at [129]-[143] (Hooper L.J., dissenting).  
90 Ibid., at [112]. 
91 Ibid. 
92 See, for example, the boilerplate non-assignment clause suggested in Thomson Reuters 
Practical Law Commercial, “Assignments and Other Dealings” (accessed 21st January 
2020): “Neither party shall assign, transfer, mortgage, charge, subcontract, delegate, 
declare a trust over or deal in any other manner with any of its rights and obligations under 
this agreement”. (emphasis added). 
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“no trust” clauses and to allow the beneficiaries of trust to bring direct suit 
under the Vandepitte procedure. Such a decision to override contractual 
freedom would not be justified.  
2. The Receivables Regulations 
In the area of receivables—claims to payment in exchange for goods and 
services—many legal systems have enacted legislation invalidating no-
assignment clauses on the ground that they interfere with factoring, the form 
of receivables financing whereby the promisor is notified of the assignment 
and is liable to suit by the financier. According to Tolhurst and Carter, 
judges themselves might have adopted this exception to freedom of contract 
due to its overwhelming popularity, 93  and in Barbados Trust, Rix L.J. 
claimed that “it would be highly undesirable if customers could totally 
prevent their suppliers from factoring their book debts by the device of a 
non-assignment clause”.94 In 2015, Parliament conferred on the government 
the power to make regulations on the subject, but it required the government 
to gain the approval of both Houses of Parliament. 95  Eventually the 
Business Contract Terms (Assignment of Receivables) Regulations 2018 
were approved by Parliament, but only after two previous versions of the 
Regulations had failed to gain Parliamentary approval. The Regulations 
frankly override freedom of contract; where they apply, they provide that a 
prohibition on assignment has “no effect”.96 
What justifies overriding freedom of contract in this particular area? 
When first proposed, the Regulations were mostly supported with reference 
to a general argument that receivables financing is a valuable activity that 
should not be affected by freedom of contract. Writing in support of the 
legislative change, Beale, Gullifer, and Paterson presented evidence from 
surveys that non-assignment clauses hindered receivables financing, 
especially factoring.97 That is not surprising, given that the very purpose of 
a non-assignment clause is to prevent factoring. In a previous consultation 
exercise that contained a plan to invalidate non-assignment clauses, the Law 
 
93 Tolhurst and Carter, “Prohibitions on Assignment”, at p. 422. 
94 Barbados Trust [2007] EWCA (Civ) 148, at [118].  
95 Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, s 161. 
96 Business Contract Terms (Assignment of Receivables) Regulations 2018, r. 2(1). 
97 Beale, Gullifer, and Paterson, “A Case for Interfering with Freedom of Contract?”, p. 
229.  
 24  
Commission noted that though the proposal was “controversial”,98 there was 
“strong support from the [factoring and discounting] industry”99  and that 
“receivables financiers think it important that prohibitions on assignment of 
a receivable should no longer be effective against the assignee”. 100 
Receivables financiers have every reason to support a legislative windfall, 
but that is not a sufficient reason to give them one. The mere fact that such 
clauses make receivables financing more difficult cannot be sufficient 
justification for the Regulations; we need a reason to promote receivables 
financing at the expense of the legitimate reasons businesses have for 
including non-assignment clauses in their contracts.101 Beale, Gullifer, and 
Paterson concluded that non-assignment clauses “seem to have an effect on 
receivables financing that is out of proportion to the benefits that the [non-
assignment clause] will bring to the customer”.102 Again, however, the law 
does not generally seek to assess the proportionality of a contract term’s 
effect on markets.  
As an alternative justification to the general argument in favour of 
financing, the proponents of legislative change made a more specific and 
more convincing claim: that the reform would help small businesses to gain 
access to finance by permitting them to factor their claims for payment even 
if they had agreed not to do so. Protecting small-business supplier-
promisees against the bargaining power of large-business customer-
promisors does, in principle, provide a valid reason to limit the effectiveness 
of non-assignment clauses. But the desire to protect small businesses was a 
poor fit as a justification for the Regulations in their initial form. As 
presented to Parliament the first and second times, the Regulations rendered 
void contractual attempts to restrict assignment of receivables in general, 
without regard to any indicator of inequality of bargaining power between 
the parties. 103  They would have applied even where the contract was 
between two large businesses, and even to cases where a corporate-
 
98 Law Commission of England and Wales, Company Security Interests, No. 296 (2005), at 
[4.38]. 
99 Ibid., at [2.35]. 
100 Ibid., at [2.38]. 
101  Beale, Gullifer and Paterson did interview two customers, who explained that the 
purposes of non-assignment clauses were related to “first, practical issues over incorrect 
invoices and, secondly, to the commercial relationship between the parties”. “A Case for 
Interfering with Freedom of Contract?”, at pp. 221-22.  
102 Ibid., at p. 229.  
103  See Draft Business Contract Terms (Assignment of Receivables) Regulations 2015; 
Draft Business Contract Terms (Assignment of Receivables) Regulations 2017. 
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behemoth promisee had agreed to forego assignment in a contract with a 
small-business promisor. The good faith of those commercial law academics 
who supported the Regulations is unquestionable. But one suspects that the 
reason this particular reform was given Parliamentary time was the desire 
of those engaged in factoring to increase their profits by amending other 
people’s contracts through their lobbying efforts. The failure to tailor the 
Regulations to cases of unequal bargaining power appears to have been 
among the reasons that the first two versions failed to receive Parliamentary 
approval.104  
The final version of the Regulations is more closely aligned with the 
goal of protecting small businesses with inadequate bargaining power. By 
way of contrast with the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, however, the 
Regulations make no attempt to decide the reasonableness of a non-
assignment clause on a case-by-case basis. The Regulations are instead 
disapplied where the promisee is a “large business”,105 which means that it 
must not be a small or medium business under the Companies Act’s 
accounting regime. Additionally, certain contracts are excluded from the 
operation of the regulations, and some of these contracts (derivatives 
contracts, for example) are likely to involve sophisticated promisees who do 
not need legislative protection.106  
It makes sense to draw sharp, clearly-administrable lines between cases 
where the Regulations apply and cases where they do not. The Regulations, 
however, still seem overbroad when compared with the small-business-
protective purpose that justifies them. A medium business is one that meets 
two of the following characteristics: (i) a turnover of not more than £36 
million; (ii) a balance sheet of not more than £18 million; (iii) no more than 
250 employees. 107 Many fairly large businesses will still be able to invoke 
the regulations. Moreover, there is no attempt to calibrate their application 
according to whether the customer is a large or a small business. As a result, 
the Regulations will invalidate large numbers of unproblematic non-
 
104  See Mayer Brown, “Withdrawal of Draft Regulations on Contractual Terms with 
Respect to Assignment of Receivables” (1st Dec. 2017). For the City of London Law 
Society’s hostile response to the first draft of the regulations, see R. Calnan, “Ban the Ban: 
Prohibiting Restrictions on the Assignment of Receivables” [2015] J.I.B.F.L. 136. 
105  Business Contract Terms (Assignment of Receivables) Regulations 2018 r. 3. 
Regulation 3 also exempts cases where the supplier is a “special purpose vehicle”.  
106 Day, “Non-Assignment Clauses”, at p. 208, notes that “a cynic might decry the power of 
special interest lobbying”. His remark appears to be directed at the decision to exempt 
various classes of contract from the Regulations, but a thoroughgoing cynic might think 
something similar about the Regulations themselves.   
107 Companies Act 2006, s.465. 
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assignment clauses alongside the problematic ones they are aimed at 
invalidating. 
B. Unless Otherwise Agreed, Debt Claims are Assignable without 
Limitation 
The law’s overall preference for assignability, especially when it comes to 
debt claims, also manifests itself in the default rules courts apply when the 
parties have not addressed assignability. The general rule is that contractual 
rights are assignable in the absence of a contractual restriction. While the 
law does make an exception to the assignability default for rights assumed 
to be personal, that category is small. Assignment is in theory limited to 
“cases where it can make no difference to the person on whom the 
obligation lies to which of two persons he is to discharge it”.108 But where 
the promisor’s obligation is to pay money, the promisee’s right is 
considered impersonal and the identity of the right-holder is deemed 
irrelevant. “The reason that the debtor’s consent is not required to an 
assignment of a debt is that the assignment cannot prejudice him”.109  
In practice, however, as cases like Barbados Trust illustrate, the right-
holder’s identity often makes all the difference. Non-assignment clauses are 
so common in contracts that there might be a strong case for reversing the 
general default rule to one of non-assignability, with limited exceptions for 
impersonal contractual rights. In some contexts, assignability might be so 
obviously contemplated that it should not be necessary to state it explicitly. 
In other cases, would it be too much to ask a party who wishes to have the 
power to transfer her rights unilaterally to bargain for it explicitly?  
If it seems too radical a step to reverse the default rule, we might at least 
blunt its sharpest edges. Perhaps the most egregious example of the 
assignability default’s tendency to overreach is Fitzroy v. Cave.110 Fitzroy 
and Cave were directors of a company; Cave was also the local manager. 
Fitzroy was unhappy with the way Cave was running the business and 
wanted to remove him from his managerial position. He set about trying to 
drive Cave into bankruptcy to disqualify him from serving as a director. 
Having discovered that Cave owed money to tradesmen who had supplied 
goods to him, Fitzroy approached the tradesmen and offered them a deal 
they couldn’t refuse: if they would assign their claims against Cave to 
Fitzroy, Fitzroy would remit the proceeds to the tradesmen.  
 
108 Tolhurst [1902] 2 K.B., at 668. 
109 Mulkerrins [2003] UKHL 41, [2003] 1 W.L.R. 1937, at [15], per Lord Millett. 
110 [1905] 2 K.B. 364. 
 27  
Under cross-examination, Fitzroy admitted that making Cave a bankrupt 
was his “sole object” in taking the assignments.111 The Court of Appeal, 
however, found the assignments valid. Collins M.R. was reluctant but felt 
bound by the prior Court of Appeal decision in Comfort v. Betts,112 which 
had upheld assignments for the purpose of debt collection. Cozens-Hardy 
L.J. relied on the assumption that section 136 expands the range of 
assignable rights, but laid more stress on the idea that a debt claim is an item 
of property and must hence be transferable to anyone for any purpose. “I fail 
to see that we have anything to do with the motives which actuate the 
plaintiff, who is simply asserting a legal right consequential upon the 
possession of property which has been validly assigned to him”.113 The 
decision was subjected to convincing contemporary criticism,114  but has 
since become well established. 
The decision in Fitzroy illustrates not only the perils of affording 
talismanic status to the idea of property but also the dangers of treating 
assignability as a rule of law rather than as an implied term. The defendant’s 
unsuccessful objection to the assignment in Fitzroy v. Cave was that it 
savoured of maintenance. But, in reality, that is not a powerful argument 
against an assignment. Treating assignability as a term of the contract, 
however, would have given Cave stronger ground to stand on. The contracts 
between Cave and the tradesman, presumably oral, said nothing about 
whether the tradesmen’s claims to payment could be assigned. But the 
presumed intentions of Cave and the tradesmen could hardly have been to 
allow assignments of claims to Cave’s worst enemy. Even if the 
assignability default remains intact, it would not be difficult to craft an 
exception to the assignability default for assignments taken solely for 
malicious purposes.  
C. Damages Claims are not Assignable Unless the Recipient Has a 
Particular Kind of Interest in Receiving the Transfer 
While overall the current law leans too heavily towards transferability, in 
one respect the law seems unreasonably hostile towards it. When it comes to 
assignments of rights to sue for unliquidated damages, English law 
continues to uphold the idea that a “bare” right to litigate cannot be assigned 
 
111 Ibid., at 368. 
112 [1891] 1 Q.B. 737.  
113 Fitzroy v. Cave, [1905] 2 K.B., at p. 374.  
114  P.H. Winfield, “Assignment of Choses in Action in Relation to Maintenance and 
Champerty” (1919) 35 L.Q.R. 143, 150–51.  
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because the transaction savours of champerty and maintenance. But, as 
noted above, there is no special public policy reason to object to assignment 
of damages claims (just as there is no special public policy reason to insist 
on the assignability of debt claims). As Tettenborn has argued, it is difficult 
to understand both the scope of this rule and the reasons for it.115  
The modern survival of this limitation on the validity of assignments 
was confirmed in Trendtex Trading Corp v Credit Suisse. 116  The case 
involved a claim arising out the Nigerian cement debacle of 1970s, when the 
government of Nigeria ordered too much cement and sought to avoid paying 
for much of it. Trendtex had agreed to sell 240,000 tons of cement; the 
Central Bank of Nigeria repudiated a letter of credit under which it had 
agreed to pay for the goods. Trendtex thus held a claim for damages—not 
for the agreed sum under the credit117 —and claimed that the damages 
amounted to $14 million. But Trendtex needed help financing the litigation, 
which involved complex issues of sovereign immunity and doubts of over 
the proper jurisdiction in which to bring suit.  
Credit Suisse had financed the transactions, and, given Trendtex’s 
financial position, Credit Suisse had no hope of getting any of its money 
back unless Trendtex was able to make something of its right to sue the 
Central Bank of Nigeria. Under pressure from Credit Suisse, Trendtex 
agreed—in an agreement stated to be governed by Swiss law and Swiss 
jurisdiction—to sell its right to sue to the Central Bank of Nigeria to Credit 
Suisse for $800,000. The agreement noted that an unnamed third party had 
agreed to buy the claim for $1.1 million. Credit Suisse immediately sold the 
right to the mysterious third party for that price; through the efforts of Credit 
Suisse’s lawyer, the mysterious third party settled the claim with the Central 
Bank of Nigeria for $8 million, making a profit of $6.9 million. Trendtex, 
on learning about what happened, felt that it had been tricked into parting 
with an asset for 10% of what it was worth. It sought to unwind the 
transaction and to sue in London rather than Switzerland. To avoid the 
exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the Swiss courts, Trendtex argued 
that the agreement to assign (including the exclusive jurisdiction clause) 
was void as against public policy.  
The House of Lords ruled that the assignment was void. 118  Lord 
Wilberforce said that an assignment to Credit Suisse alone would have been 
 
115 Tettenborn, “Assignment of Rights to Compensation”. 
116 [1982] A.C. 679.  
117 Ibid., at p. 694. 
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valid because Credit Suisse had a “genuine and substantial interest” in the 
sense that it legitimately wished to be paid what Trendtex owed it.119 Lord 
Roskill stated similarly that the question was whether Credit Suisse had a 
“genuine commercial interest in the enforcement of the claim of another”.120 
The problem, however, was that Credit Suisse was not motivated by its 
genuine commercial interest when it took the assignment; rather, it planned 
immediately to sell the claim to someone with no previous connection to the 
claim.  
One difficulty with the law after Trendtex is that it is uncertain what 
counts as a legitimate commercial interest.121 But the more fundamental 
question is whether the maintenance-and-champerty doctrine provides any 
reason to invalidate assignments of otherwise-assignable rights. A particular 
problem with the current public policy rule is that it would seem to apply 
even if the parties to the contract had explicitly permitted assignability of an 
unliquidated claim for breach. Just as there is no general public policy 
reason to override no-assignment clauses, so there is also no public policy 
reason to override clauses affirmatively allowing assignability. 
In truth, the real dispute in Trendtex had little to do with assignability. 
No objection to the assignment was raised by the promisor. The Central 
Bank of Nigeria had settled the case with the mysterious assignee. The 
dispute was instead between the promisee (Trendtex) and the initial assignee 
(Credit Suisse). Trendtex’s real complaint was that Credit Suisse had 
committed fraud, duress, and/or breach of fiduciary duty in connection with 
the initial contract to assign; in short, it had been tricked or forced into 
parting with its right against the Central Bank of Nigeria for less than its 
real value. Trendtex’s successful invocation of an illegality objection to the 
assignment was somewhat opportunistic; had Trendtex been given a larger 
share of the profit from the work of the mysterious assignee, it would not 
have complained. 
Another sign that the champerty-and-maintenance limitation on 
assignability is on shaky ground is its inapplicability to debt claims. If the 
action in Trendtex had been for the agreed sum under the letter of credit as 
opposed to a damages claim, there would apparently have been no public 
policy problem with the assignment. The nineteenth-century case of 
Comfort v Betts ruled that it was permissible for a debt collector—someone 
with no “genuine commercial interest” in the claim—to take an assignment 
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121 See Tettenborn, “Assignment of Rights to Compensation”.  
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of the debt and to split the proceeds of litigation with the assignor.122 In the 
later case of Laurent v Sale & Co. the court found that a similar arrangement 
was champertous.123 But that decision was an aberration, and the decision of 
the Court of Appeal in Camdex has made it clear that the assignment of a 
debt claim cannot be impugned on these grounds.124 This case involved the 
assignment of distressed debt to a “vulture fund”. It was mentioned above 
for its approval both of the mistaken “debts as property” assumption and of 
the erroneous claim that statutory assignment is available in a broader set of 
circumstances than equitable assignment. Here, the main point about 
Camdex is that it is difficult to make understand why debt claims should be 
excluded from the purview of any champerty-and-maintenance limit on 
assignment.125 If the law were genuinely concerned about maintenance and 
champerty, it would similarly be concerned in cases like Camdex where it 
was evident from the moment of assignment that the assignee would need to 
bring litigation to assert the claim, and where the assignee had no prior 
interest in the dispute.  
We should be careful, however, before completely jettisoning this line of 
cases. Though much refinement would be needed, it might just about be 
possible to recast the champerty-and-maintenance exception to assignability 
as a rough-and-ready default rule that attempts to reflect implied party 
intention to limit the circumstances in which assignment is permissible. 
Perhaps the parties to contracts, if they had time to fully specify their 
agreement, might often agree that bringing a third party into a dispute over 
an unliquidated damages claim is too conducive to the prolonging of the 
dispute to be worthwhile. Conversely, a better basis for the decision in 
Camdex might be that the parties to the original contract appear to have 
contemplated that the Bank of Zambia’s debts were to be assignable; the 
written contract referred to the parties’ “assigns”.126 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The English law of assignability of contractual rights is so deeply affected 
by unfounded assumptions that an entirely fresh start would be ideal. But it 
is unrealistic to expect judges to start from scratch. In the short term, we 
might hope to banish the faulty ideas criticised in Part II from debates over 
the future of assignability. Once these ideas have been rejected, a more 
convincing and coherent accommodation between assignability and non-
assignability may emerge in time. Most importantly, judges and legislators 
should respect the sovereignty of the original parties to the contract over the 
issue of assignability, except where a demonstrable problem of inequality 
between those parties demands the law’s intervention. 
